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COMMENTS
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION IN CASES INVOLVING
DOUBTFUL QUESTIONS OF LAW
Two cases recently reported tend to assign the problem of injunctive relief pendente lite in Wisconsin to a Limbo of utter unpredictability.
In the first case, the plaintiff was an Illinois corporation that manufactured and sold wine to wholesalers. The defendant sold wine at
retail. On September 22, 1953, the plaintiff began the practice of selling its products in Wisconsin under Fair-Trade contracts. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant sold plaintiff's products at prices less
than those set forth in plaintiff's price lists and sought to enjoin
defendant from violating the Fair-Trade contracts. One of the defenses
raised by the defendant was that the plaintiff was not licensed to
transact business iri Wisconsin; and, therefore, was not privileged to
sue in the courts of Wisconsin. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction restraining the defendant, pending the
final determination of the action, from selling the plaintiff's products at
prices below those fixed in the plaintiff's price lists. Plaintiff appealed.
Held: Affirmed. The court ruled that "when an issue of law, such as
that raised by the allegation in the answer as to failure of the plaintiff
to be licensed to transact business in Wisconsin, is raised in good faith
and an application is made by the plaintiff for temporary injunction,
we deem it to be discretionary with the trial court whether to pass
upon the question of law at the time of such application for temporary
injunction, or to defer so doing until the trial on the merits." Mogen
David Wine Corporation v. Borenstein, 267 Wis. 503, 66 N.W.2d 157
(1954). The court implied that when such an issue of law is raised the
temporary injunction should preferably be refused, since it expressly
approved the following statement which appears in an Iowa case :'
"The writ [temporary injunction] is to a great extent a preventive remedy; and where the parties are in dispute concerning their legal rights, it will not ordinarily be granted until
the right is established, especially if the legal or equitable
claims' 2asserted raise questions of a doubtful or unsettled character.
In the second case, the plaintiff licensed individuals and corporations to soften water commercially using the plaintiff's name, method
and equipment. The defendant, assignee of such a license, formed a
corporation to conduct the business *permitted by the license. The
Beidenkopt v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434 (1913).

2 Ibid., 142 NA., at 437.
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license agreement provided that the licensee was not to engage, either
as an individual or by or through a corporation, in any phase of the
water softening service business except under and pursuant to the
licensing agreement; and that the licensee was to buy all his requirements of water softening materials and equipment from the plaintiff.
Later, the defendant organized a second corporation. Plaintiff sought
to enjoin defendant, acting through the second corporation, from selling to operators of water softening businesses materials which were
imitative of those put out by the plaintiff; and from soliciting sales
from plaintiff's licensees, thereby inducing them to breach their contracts with plaintiff. Defendant contended that the plaintiff's licenses
constituted illegal agreements in restraint of trade. The trial court
granted a temporary injunction. The defendant appealed. Held:
Affirmed. Appellant relied heavily on the Mogen David case; and
maintained that, since the trial court was presented with a serious
question of law which it didn't decide, the trial court should have refused to grant the temporary injunction. In discussing the import of
the Mogen David decision the court said:
"We consider that generally it is the better practice, when legal
or equitable defenses are raised which appear meritorious to
the trial court, to deny the application for the temporary injunction until such issues can be disposed of, but we did not intend
to say that the court which grants a temporary injunction without first resolving such legal questions has thereby abused its
discretion. The circumstances of each case must determine
that."
Culligan, Inc. v. Rheaume, 269 Wis. 242, 68 N.W.2d 810 (1955).
The basic factual situation and the legal question presented by these
two cases are substantially identical. In the Mogen David case, the
plaintiff sought to preserve its business reputation by requiring the
defendant not to sell its products at prices below those fixed in its
Fair-Trade contract price lists. In the Culligan case, the same objective
was sought by requiring the defendant not to sell products which were
imitative of the plaintiff's products. The plaintiff, in both cases, sought
to preserve the status quo, 3 contending that the status quo, threatened

with disruption by the defendant's unlawful activities, was the business
reputation of the plaintiff. In both cases substantial questions of law
were raised by the pleadings which the trial court refused to determine.
And yet, in the one case a temporary injunction was refused while
in the other case it was granted. Again, it should be noted that the
Supreme Court has endorsed the Iowa view which the Court set forth
3 The status quo sought to be preserved by the temporary injunction refers to the
last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status of the parties, which preceded the
pending suit. City of Farmersville v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co., 33 S.W.2d
272 (Texas) (1930).
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in the Mogen David case and which it emphasized in the Culligan
case by stating that the better practice is to deny the temporary injunction when the parties are in dispute as to their legal rights.
If any concrete propositions may be gleaned from the principal
cases, they are these: that the issuance of a temporary injunction is a
matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court; that before exercising its discretion the trial court should see whether a legal
or factual issue is presented by the pleadings; and that, if such an
issue is presented, the better practice is to refuse the injunction until
the legal or factual questions have been disposed of.
It is the thesis of the author that the rule enunciated by our Court,
whereby it is deemed the better practice to deny a temporary injunction when untried and unsettled legal issues are raised, is out of harmony not only with decisions of other jurisdictions but also with past
decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and with the equitable
principles under which temporary injunctions are to be issued.
At the outset, it would be profitable to consider the purpose of a
temporary injunction. Precisely why does power exist in equity to
control situations pending litigation of alleged rights? Justice Marshall
considered this question at the turn of the century and concluded that
the power is given to ". . . promote the ends of justice . . .to the end
that irreparableloss and useless litigation may be prevented, so far as
that can justly be done in advance of a final determination of the
rights of the parties."4 (emphasis added.) Since the purpose of a
temporary injunction is to promote justice by preventing irreparable
loss to the party seeking it, common sense alone would indicate that
this lofty objective ought not to be thwarted simply because the trial
court is presented with a doubtful or unsettled question of law. Justice
Marshall so held when he ruled that:
"Notwithstanding the conflict between complaint and answer
as to the facts or the law, it is still within the discretionary
power of the court, by a temporary injunction, to preserve the
status quo between the parties pending the final decree and to
prevent the doing of the acts complained of during such pendency if that be necessary to save the plaintiff or the defendant
from irreparable injury by the conduct of his adversary in the
meantime." 5
The Michigan court, too, would not deny the temporary injunction
where the law is doubtful so long as its issuance is necessary to prevent irremediable harm to the petitioner:
"It is not necessary that the complainant's rights be clearly
established, or that the court find complainant is entitled to
4The Milw. Elec. Ry & Light Co. v. Bradley, 108 Wis. 467, 484, 84 N.W. 870

(1901).

5Ibid., p. 486.
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prevail on the final hearing. It is sufficient if it appears that
there is a real and substantial question between the parties, to
be investigated in a court of equity, and, in order to prevent
irremedial injury to the complainant before his claims can be
investigated, it is necessary to prohibit any change in the condiof the property and of the parties during the
tions and relations
6'
litigation.

Furthermore, the law is well settled that the granting or refusing
of a temporary injuncttion is a matter that rests in the sound judicial
discretion of the trial court.7 If a temporary injunction were to be
denied simply because the defendant has caused to be raised a doubtful
question of law, then courts of equity would be divested of their discretionary power to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of his adversary pending the trial on the merits of the case. And, as our court
has remarked, "That would be absurd." 8
Moreover, if the mere raising of an unsettled point of law were
sufficient to bar a court of equity from issuing a temporary injunction,
and the subject matter of the litigation is thereby destroyed or substantially impaired, the final hearing and the appeal therefrom by the
plaintiff in the event of an adverse decree ".

.

. would be vain forms." 9

The court would lose its power of fully vindicating the rights of the
plaintiff were they established on final hearing or on appeal.
In the Mogen David case, our court quoted with approval an Iowa
case which held that an injunction will not be granted where there is
a dispute as to the legal right involved especially where the right
of the complainant is doubtful. This rule is grounded on the proposition that it is the duty of the equity courts to protect acknowledged
rights rather than to establish new and doubtful ones and that the
plaintiff's remedy is to first establish his right in an action at law and
then to come into equity, if necessary, for the protection of the legally
established right. 10 It may be remarked in this connection that, under
the old system of jurisprudence where relief in equity was administered by a different tribunal and by a different procedure from those
controlling relief at law, there is some merit to this line of reasoning.
However, it would seem that there is no good reason why, in code
states where both systems are united, relief should not be granted in
the first instance by injunction." Apart from this consideration, howMining Co. v. Houghton Circuit Judge, 177 Mich. 632, 144 N.W. 209, 212
(1913).
7 Fassbender v. Peters, 179 Wis. 587, 191 N.W. 973 (1923) ; Gross v. Merrimac,
210 Wis. 682, 247 N.W. 335 (1933) ; State ex rel Attorney General v. Manske,
231 Wis. 16, 285 N.W. 378 (1939).
8
Supra, note 4, 108 Wis. at 484.
9 Christiansen v. Local 680 of Milk Drivers, 127 N.J. Eq. 215, 219, 12 A.2d 170,
172 (1940).
10 14 R.C.L. §58.
11Ibid.
0Baltic
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ever, it has been generally held that the rule against equity protection
of an unsettled legal right is inapplicable when there is a showing of
a threatened, irreparable injury.1 2 An early landmark case is Bettnman
v. Harness." In that case, the plaintiff was the assignee of two leases
which granted the exclusive privilege to drill for oil and gas on certain
lands. Later, the owners of the fee, claiming that the leases had expired, executed a lease to one Finnegan who thereupon took possession
and began drilling for oil. The plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction enjoining operations under the second lease and the defendants
sought to have it dissolved. The jurisdiction of the equity court was
questioned on the ground that the action involved a dispute as to legal
title. The court held that, despite a conflict as to legal right, it had the
power to grant a temporary injunction where a showing of irreparable
damage was made. The court said:
"Take the case where irreparable injury is being done to land
claimed under two hostile titles. One party files a bill of injunction showing on its face clear title, and the other answers,
showing clear title prima facie. Will you at once dissolve the
injunction, and send the party to try his title at law, from the
fact that there are adverse claims, when in fact the plaintiff
ultimately shows, or could show, the better title? . . . I think

the true answer to that question is 'No'. Where there is irreparable damage, injunction lies, though there be conflicting
title."' 4
A noted authority on injunctions, after remarking that a temporary injunction may properly be allowed where it is necessary to preserve
the rights of the parties in statu quo until the determination of the
controversy although the parties are at issue upon a question of legal
right, states the reason for this rule to be that ".

.

. in such cases

courts of equity do not assume jurisdiction to dispose of the legal
rights in controversy, but confine themselves to protecting those rights
as they then are, pending an adjudication upon the legal questions
involved."' 15
When a court of equity is asked to grant a temporary injunction
its decision should not be controlled by the fact that the petitioner has
not demonstrated that his alleged legal right, sought to be protected
by injunctive relief, is absolutely certain and wholly without doubt.
1232 A.L.R. 502.
13 42 W. Va. 433, 26

S.E. 271 (1896).
14 See also Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.v. Interstate Transportation Co., 155 U.S. 585,
155 S.Ct. 228 (1895) (temporary injunction granted restraining owners of
barges from passing through plaintiff's draw-bridge in such a manner as to
injure the bridge. The court held "When a court of equity is satisfied that
irreparable injuries may be occasioned by careless or wanton action . . .the
ordinary rule that the court will not act where there is a dispute about the
title or the extent of the legal rights of the parties does not apply, but it may
grant relief by injunction before a trial at law.")
15 High, INJUNcrIONS (3rd ed.) §8.

[Vol. 40

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Rather, the court should be influenced by equitable principles. It
should "balance the equities" and consider what harm would result
to the parties if the relief asked for were granted or denied. Particularly is this true, say the federal courts, where the questions of law
presented by the parties are serious and doubtful:
"When the questions to be ultimately decided are serious and
doubtful, the legal discretion of the judge in granting the writ
should be influenced largely by the consideration that the injury
to the moving party will be certain, great, and irreparable if the
motion is denied, while the inconvenience and loss to the opposing party will be inconsiderable, and may well be indemnified
by a proper bond, if the injunction is granted. .

.

. A pre-

liminary injunction maintaining the status quo may properly
issue whenever the questions of law or fact to be ultimately
determined in a suit are grave and difficult, and injury to the
moving party will be immediate, certain and great if it is denied,
while the loss or inconvenience to the opposing party will be
comparatively small and insignificant if it is granted." 16
In a case arising in 1954,17 the Federal Circuit Court for the 7th
Circuit affirmed the proposition long adhered to by the federal courts
that upon application for a temporary injunction, the court will not
deny the injunction simply because substantial questions of law are
presented which raise serious doubt of the ultimate success of the
petitioner. In that case, the plaintiff, a California corporation, engaged
in distributing a product known as Nutrilite Food Supplement, sought
to enjoin a competitor, who engaged if distributing a product known
as Numanna Food Supplement, from inducing plaintiff's distributors
to violate their contracts with the plaintiff. The defendants contended
that no valid contract existed between the plaintiff and its distributors
as the contracts lacked mutuality and were in restraint of trade. The
lower court granted plaintiff a temporary injunction and the defendant
appealed. In affirming the lower court, the Circuit Court, after remarking that it was, convinced that a "serious legal issue is involved"' s
went on to say that:
"To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the
plaintiff's right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely
certain, wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present
City of Newton v. Levis, 79 Fed. 715, 718, 25 C.C.A. 161 (1897) (temporary injunction granted restraining city from destroying certain of plaintiff's property
pending final hearing on validity of revocation of an ordinance) ; see also Wilmington City Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 198 Fed. 159, 197 (1912) where the court
stated "The balance of convenience or hardship ordinarily is a factor of controlling importance in cases of substantial doubt existing at the time of granting or refusing the preliminary injunction. Such doubt may relate either to
the facts or to the law of the case, or both."
17 Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. Numanna Laboratories, 215 F.2d 382 (1954).
sIbid., p. 385.
18
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(i.e., the balance of hardship tips decidedly toward plaintiff),
it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions
going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful,
as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more
deliberate investigation."' 19
In Wisconsin, past decisions of the Supreme Court are in line with
the principles enunciated above. The Wisconsin court is dedicated to
the equitable rule that in passing upon the application for injunctive
relief pending the final hearing it must weigh the equities, and not have
its discretionary power displaced by a rule which would deny the
temporary injunction whenever the legal claims asserted raise questions of a doubtful or unsettled character. While there are many cases
in Wisconsin which assert that the propriety of a temporary injunction depends on a showing that there is a reasonable probability of
plaintiff's ultimate success in the action,20 it has been held that such
"reasonable probability" is not negated simply because there is a fair
doubt as to the law.2 In Eau Claire Dells Imp. Co. v. City of Eau
Claire,22 the Wisconsin court adopted the rule that:
"In passing upon the propriety of a temporary injunction the
sufficiency of the complaint will be assumed, if a fair doubt of
law or 2fact
as to plaintiff's ultimate right of recovery is pre3
sented."

The court went on to say that a temporary injunction will be granted:
"....

where it is shown that the preservation of the status quo

pending the action is necessary to avoid the probability of plaintiff suffering irreparable loss and the final decree being ineffectual to accomplish the purpose of the litigation." 24
In City of Milwaukee v. Gimbel Brothers, 25 the Court said that whenever a showing of irreparable harm to the moving party is shown,
".. . if there is any reasonable probability because of fair doubt as to
either law or fact, that plaintiff may ultimately recover, it is the part
of wise judicial discretion to maintain the existing conditions by a
26
properly guarded restraining order."
F.2d 738 (1953)
from which the court in the Mytinger case quoted with approval; Iowa
Southern Utilities Co. v. Town of Lamoni, 11 F.Supp. 581, appeal dismissed
(C.C.A.) 79 F.2d 1000 (1935) where the court held that a temporary injunction
should issue where the facts or the law raise serious doubt or require that the
cause be continued in status quo until a full and complete hearing can be had
20 and a decision rendered.
De Pauw v. Oxley, 122 Wis. 656, 100 N.W. 1028 (1904) ; Halsey, Stuart & Co.
v. Public Service Comm. of Wisconsin, 212 Wis. 184, 248 N.W. 458 (1933);
Welch v. Chippewa Sales Co., 252 Wis. 166, 31 N.W.2d 170 (1948).
21 City of Milw. v. Gimbel Brothers, 130 Wis. 31, 110 N.W. 7 (1906).
22 134 Wis. 548, 115 N.W. 155 (1908).
23 134 Wis. 558, 115 N.W. 158.
24 134 Wis. 560, 115 N.W. 159.
25
Supra, note 21.
26 Ibid. at 130 Wis. 34; see also Pioneer Wood-Pulp Co. v. Bensley, 70 Wis. 476,
19 Ibid.; see also Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206
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CONCLUSION

It is the contention of the author that the rule adopted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Mogen David and the Culligan cases
whereby it is deemed the better practice to deny a temporary injunction where the parties are in dispute concerning their legal rights,
especially if the claims asserted raise questions of a doubtful character,
is a rule which lacks the support both of judicial precedent and judicious reasoning. It would permit a defendant to divest the court of its
practical power to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of his opponent pending the final hearing; it would render the court incapable
of fully vindicating the rights of the plaintiff should he prevail at the
trial or at the appellate level; it would defeat the very purpose of
injunctive relief by paralyzing the power of the court to prevent irreparable injury. It is submitted that the true factors governing the
issuance of temporary injuntions have been set forth in prior Wisconsin cases and in the decisions of other courts, both state and federal.
The primary consideration influencing the court's discretion should not
be the number or complexity of untried and unsettled questions of law
but rather the necessity (or lack of necessity) for preserving the
status quo pending the determination of the controversy. In determining this question, the court should be guided by the probable harm
which will be inflicted upon the parties if it should grant or refuse
the relief sought. It should be an abuse of discretion for a lower
court to balk at granting a temporary injunction simply because unsettled questions of law are raised where there is a showing by the
moving party of imminent irreparable injury.
DAVID M.

KAISER

36 N.W. 321 (1888). The court in the Bensley case reviews the authorities
and concludes that when the legal right involved is not clear the court will
decide on a balance of convenience and inconvenience to the parties whether
interim relief is or is not expedient.

